The fighter jets that accompanied President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s aircraft into Kazakh airspace on 13 May were not merely a ceremonial gesture; rather, they represented a geopolitical assertion: Türkiye has established its presence in Central Asia not as a guest, but as a co-architect of the region’s future. However, beneath the significance of the 13 agreements signed in Astana and the digital aspirations proclaimed in Turkistan lies a paradox that has yet to be articulated by analysts: Türkiye’s rise within the Organisation of Turkic States (OTS) serves as both its most remarkable strategic achievement and its most structurally vulnerable position.
The “Declaration of Eternal Friendship and Partnership,” signed by President Erdoğan and President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, transcends mere diplomatic formalities. It signifies a fundamental reassessment of how Türkiye forges alliances. In contrast to Ankara’s transactional relationships with Western capitals and its intricate balancing act with Russia and China, the partnership between Kazakhstan and Türkiye is founded on civilizational affinity as a form of strategic capital. This approach embodies the most sophisticated manifestation of entrepreneurial and humanitarian foreign policy. The thirteen agreements encompass investment protection, energy cooperation through KazMunayGas and TPAO, joint ventures in defence, including the production of ANKA drones, the establishment of a cultural centre, and a memorandum between the Astana International Financial Centre and the Istanbul Financial Centre. The scope of these agreements is intentional; Türkiye is not aiming for a bilateral relationship but is instead constructing an interdependent ecosystem.
The decision to host the OTS informal summit in Turkistan, the spiritual capital of the Turkic World, further enhances this ecosystem. The inauguration of the ‘Center of Turkic Civilization’ and the Turkistan Declaration on AI and digital development indicate that the OTS is moving from cultural symbolism toward technological ambition. However, this presents a paradox: the 7% Trap. The OTS represents a collective GDP exceeding $2.1 trillion and a population of 178 million. Nevertheless, intra-OTS trade constitutes a mere 7% of the total foreign trade of member states. This statistic is not simply a numerical observation; it serves as a structural indictment. The Turkic world engages in trade with distant powers more readily than it does with its own members.
In examining the trade architecture, it is noteworthy that in 2025, Kazakhstan’s trade with OTS countries reached a total of $12.9 billion, with Türkiye at the forefront, contributing $4.36 billion. This figure appears significant until it is contextualised within Kazakhstan’s overall foreign trade turnover, which greatly exceeds it. Furthermore, the Middle Corridor, Türkiye’s flagship connectivity initiative, experienced a remarkable increase in cargo volumes, reaching 3.3 million tons in 2024, nearly six times the levels recorded in 2021. However, this is comparatively modest when set against the volumes transported via traditional northern routes. In 2025, Türkiye’s exports to OTS member states amounted to $11 billion, contributing to a record total of $396 billion in overall Turkish exports. Despite its growth, the Turkic market remains a marginal element within Ankara’s global economic strategy. This situation presents a paradox: although Türkiye is the most influential member of the OTS, the organisation has yet to attain sufficient strength to serve as Türkiye’s primary strategic platform.
What distinguishes Türkiye’s approach is its refusal to regard this structural limitation as a permanent condition. The entrepreneurial foreign policy actively seeks to create markets rather than waiting for them to develop organically. The defence sector serves as a prime illustration of this strategy. The ANKA drone joint venture exemplifies not merely an arms transaction, but a mechanism for technology transfer that links Kazakhstan’s military modernisation with Turkish industrial capabilities. In an age where drone warfare has transformed conflict across regions from Ukraine to the Caucasus, Türkiye is positioning itself as a central security partner for the Turkic world, not through military deployments, but via technological interdependence.
Similarly, the investment agreement between TAV Holding for Almaty International Airport and the hospital construction contracts with YDA İnşaat exemplify “humanitarian infrastructure,” serving as a tangible representation of Turkish soft power. When a citizen of Kazakhstan arrives at an airport operated by Turkish investment and receives medical care at a hospital constructed by Turkish firms, the abstract notion of Turkic solidarity takes on a concrete form. The digital aspect is equally ambitious. The emphasis of the OTS summit on artificial intelligence and digital development, in conjunction with Kazakhstan’s Alem.ai International AI Centre and Türkiye’s ongoing digital transformation, indicates the emergence of a “Digital Silk Road” that operates independently of both Chinese and Western paradigms. The Turkic Investment Fund, which is based in Istanbul and set to commence operations in early 2026, aims to finance such integrative projects.
Türkiye’s approach diverges significantly from that of great-power competition, particularly in its humanitarian aspect. Whereas China employs debt-trap infrastructure and Russia provides security arrangements with conditionalities, Türkiye promotes the Maarif Foundation, which establishes educational institutions that foster Turkic identity from Tashkent to Astana. The recent agreement to inaugurate two new Turkish Maarif schools in Kazakhstan should not be perceived as mere charity; rather, it constitutes a long-term investment in identity. This underpins the subtle engine of Turkish influence: 5,000 Turkish-capital enterprises operating in Kazakhstan, $6 billion in accumulated investments, 98 completed joint projects valued at $4 billion, and 50 ongoing projects worth $3.9 billion. These figures signify not only capital flows but also employment opportunities, technology transfer, and the emergence of a Turkish-Kazakhstani stakeholder class with vested interests in bilateral relations.
Furthermore, the humanitarian approach is evident in crisis response. As global supply chains encountered disruptions, Türkiye’s logistical capacity, developed through operations spanning from Somalia to Syria, demonstrated adaptability to the needs of Central Asia. The 35% increase in rail cargo between Kazakhstan and Türkiye projected for 2025, reaching 6.4 million tons, illustrates the convergence of humanitarian connectivity and commercial infrastructure.
Despite these achievements, Türkiye’s position is characterised by a significant vulnerability: overextension without adequate institutional depth. The Organisation of Turkic States (OTS) remains an entity lacking binding mechanisms. It does not possess a customs union, a common market, or a mutual defence clause. Although the Turkistan Declaration and the initiative to enhance the Secretariat’s digital capabilities represent steps towards institutionalisation, these measures remain voluntary.
Türkiye’s bilateral relationship with Kazakhstan is strong; however, its multilateral influence within the OTS is limited by the varying interests of member states. The energy policies of Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan’s multi-vector diplomacy, Kyrgyzstan’s proximity to China, and Turkmenistan’s stance of neutrality contribute to a complex framework in which Turkish leadership is acknowledged but not unequivocally dominant. Furthermore, the Middle Corridor is confronted with structural bottlenecks. The World Bank anticipates that freight volumes may surpass 10 million tonnes by 2030, yet achieving this target necessitates the resolution of border delays, the harmonisation of digital documentation, and the interoperability of rail gauges. These challenges are not merely technical; they are fundamentally political, requiring ongoing institutional coordination that the OTS has yet to effectively demonstrate.
Türkiye’s challenge lies in transforming OTS from a platform for presidential summits into a mechanism for daily economic governance. The current intra-trade figure of 7% must be increased to 17%, and subsequently to 27%. The Turkic Investment Fund must evolve from a symbolic institution into a financial engine comparable to the role of the Asian Development Bank in Southeast Asia. President Erdoğan’s visit to Astana and the Turkistan summit represent a pivotal moment, illustrating that Türkiye’s entrepreneurial and humanitarian foreign policy can yield tangible outcomes in Central Asia. The thirteen agreements, digital initiatives, and defence cooperation are concrete achievements. However, the true test lies ahead. Will Türkiye capitalise on its current momentum to establish irreversible institutional integration, or will the Turkistan summit be remembered merely as a high-water mark, impressive in ceremony but fleeting in substance?
In conclusion, Türkiye’s distinctive contribution to the OTS is its capacity to articulate a vision that transcends mere economic cooperation. By framing the organisation as a civilisational project, linking the spiritual heritage of Turkistan with the digital future of artificial intelligence, Ankara offers member states a narrative of shared destiny rooted in common identity rather than geopolitical necessity, something neither Brussels nor Beijing can provide. The fighter jet escort over Kazakh skies thus bears profound symbolism. It signifies Türkiye’s willingness to project power in defence of Turkic interests, while also indicating that this projection is grounded in partnership rather than domination. The success of the entrepreneurial and humanitarian foreign policy is contingent upon its ability to create stakeholders rather than dependents.